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COMPETITION AND EQUILIBRIA OF PRIVATE TOLL ROADS IN A TRAFFIC NETWORK.
| 题名： | COMPETITION AND EQUILIBRIA OF PRIVATE TOLL ROADS IN A TRAFFIC NETWORK. |
| 作者： | Yang-H; Woo-KK |
| 关键词： | Case-studies; Competition-; Equilibrium-Systems; Game-theory; Mathematical-models; Private-enterprise; Profits-; Toll-roads |
| 摘要： | The equilibria based on a situation in which two or more profit-maximizing private firms operate multiple toll roads in a road network are examined. The profits are interrelated because of demand interdependence in the network. A competitive game model is developed to analyze the strategic interactions between the private toll road operators in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. A simple but representative case of two competitive firms, each providing a single toll road (corresponding to a single link) on the network, is considered in which the two toll roads are either substitutable or complementary in terms of their demand interdependence. A quasi-Newton method in conjunction with a sensitivity analysis method of equilibrium network flow is used to determine the competitive game solutions subject to network equilibrium constraints. |
| 总页数： | Transportation Research Record. 2000. (1733) pp15-22 (6 Fig., 2 Tab., 17 Ref.) |
| 报告类型： | 科技报告 |
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