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原文传递 Route Monopolie and Optimal Nonlinear Pricing

题名：	Route Monopolie and Optimal Nonlinear Pricing
作者：	Tournut, Jacques
关键词：	optimal；ricin；online；linear；route；opol；distribution；instruments；characteristics；dimension
摘要：	To cope with air traffic growth and congested airports, two solutions are apparent on the supply side: 1) use larger aircraft in the hub and spoke system; or 2) develop new routes through secondary airports. An enlarged route system through secondary airports may increase the proportion of route monopolies in the air transport market.The monopoly optimal non linear pricing policy is well known in the case of one dimension (one instrument, one characteristic) but not in the case of several dimensions. This paper explores the robustness of the one dimensional screening model with respect to increasing the number of instruments and the number of characteristics. The objective of this paper is then to link and fill the gap in both literatures. One of the merits of the screening model has been to show that a great varieD" of economic questions (non linear pricing, product line choice, auction design, income taxation, regulation...) could be handled within the same framework.VCe study a case of non linear pricing (2 instruments (2 routes on which the airline pro_ddes customers with services), 2 characteristics (demand of services on these routes) and two values per characteristic (low and high demand of services on these routes)) and we show that none of the conclusions of the one dimensional analysis remain valid. In particular, upward incentive compatibility constraint may be binding at the optimum. As a consequence, they may be distortion at the top of the distribution. In addition to this, we show that the optimal solution often requires a kind of form of bundling, we explain explicitly distortions and show that it is sometimes optimal for the monopolist to only produce one good (instead of two) or to exclude some buyers from the market. Actually, this means that the monopolist cannot fully apply his monopoly power and is better off selling both goods independently.We then define all the possible solutions in the case of a quadratic cost function for a uniform distribution of agent types and explain the implications for airlines in terms of service differentiation.
报告类型：	科技报告