摘要: |
At 10:39 p.m. (CST) on Monday, March 20, 2006, a side collision occurred between Union Pacific Remote Control Yard Switching Job YLT 25R-20 and Union Pacific Manual Yard Switching Job YLT 67-20. This accident happened on other than main track in the Longview Texas Yard at mile 88.5 on the Little Rock Subdivision of the North Little Rock Service Unit. The method of operation at the point of the collision was Other than main track. Longview Texas Yard lies within the city of Longview, Texas. Striking train YLT 25R -20 was pulling in a eastward geographic direction, on other than main track, and at a recorded speed of 10 mph when the accident occurred. This train consisted of 3 locomotives, 14 loads, and 21 empties. It was 2294 feet long with 2221 trailing tons. The striking train was being operated under remote control and exceeded the limits of an active and established remote control zone on a switching lead. The crew was not protecting the leading end of their movement when the accident occurred. Struck train YLT 67-20 was shoving in a westward geographic direction, down the switching lead, and into an adjacent yard track at a recorded speed of 5 mph when struck. This train consisted of 2 locomotives, 32 loads, and 4 empties. It was 2197 feet long with 4271 trailing tons. The accident happened in darkness. The weather was reported as 45 degrees and clear. No one was injured. The lead locomotive on the striking derailed remaining upright. Five loaded tank cars derailed on the struck train, four of which overturned. About one quart of combustible liquid, N.O.S., (2-Ethyl Hexanol), NA1993, leaked from the top hatch of one of the overturned tanks. There was no evacuation. U.S. Highway 259 was closed at the sight for approximately 3 hours during initial assessment. Total FRA reportable damages were $254,061. The accident was due to human error. The primary cause of the accident was the failure of the remote control crew on the striking train to protect the leading end of their movement as required by carrier operating rules. A contributing cause was the intentional disabling of the Pull-back Stop Protection system on the remote control locomotive. This system is designed to prevent the locomotive from operating beyond the remote control zone. Disabling and then operating the locomotive with the disabled Pull-back Stop Protection system allowed the locomotive to go beyond the limits of the active zone where it struck another train. |