摘要: |
Abstract China has experienced rapid urbanization in the last few decades. In this context, housing demolition becomes a challenge involving people’s livelihood during the process of urban renewal. As a legacy issue, the governance of informal housing is imminent. Small-property-rights housing (SPRH) refers to long-term, large-scale informal housing built on collectively owned land in China. Although Collectively Owned Land Price Assessment Guidance stipulates that SPRH cannot be demolished forcibly without compensation. However, Land Management Law states that compensation standards depend on local governments, resulting in unfair compensation. By integrating the first-difference model (FDM) and the boundary-fixed-effect model into the hedonic pricing model, this study proposes a model of demolition compensation of SPRH based on market value standard, which takes state-owned land compensation standard and residential land floor price into account. Using the case of Nanjing, this study estimates whether Xingdu Garden’s demolition compensation deviates from a reasonable level. The results indicate that compensation is reasonable. Residents can take advantage of compensation to purchase affordable housing, and generous subsidies have significantly improved their living standards. FDM can also offer technical support for assessing the rationality of informal housing compensation. These findings, providing a reference for urban renewal and social equity, can be applied to other cities. |