题名: |
Position Verification Systems for an Automated Highway System. |
作者: |
Warner, D. C.; Gerdes, R.; Biswas, B.; Heaslip, K. |
关键词: |
Grid electrical systems, Inter-vehicular communication, Computerized simulation, Estimates, Models, Open loop systems, Position(Location), Real time, Reduction, Simulation, Validation, Cyber security strategy, Automated vehicles, Highway data collection, Mechanical coupling principle, Vehicle dynamics, Position Verification Systems |
摘要: |
Automated vehicles promote road safety, fuel efficiency, and reduced travel time by decreasing traffic congestion and driver workload. In a vehicle platoon (grouping vehicles to increase road capacity by managing distance between vehicles using electrical and mechanical coupling) of such automated vehicles, as in automated highway systems (AHS), tracking of inter-vehicular spacing is one of the significant factors under consideration. Because of close spacing, computer-controlled platoons with inter-vehicular communication—the concept of adaptive cruise control (ACC)—become open to cyber security attacks. Cyber physical (CP) and cyber attacks on smart grid electrical systems have been a significant focus of researchers. However, CP attacks on autonomous vehicle platoons have not been examined. This research surveys a number of models of longitudinal vehicle motion and analysis of a special class of CP attacks called false data injection (FDI) on vehicle platoons. In this kind of attack, the configuration of any CP system is exploited to introduce arbitrary errors to gain control over the system. Here, an n-vehicle platoon is considered and a linearized vehicle model is used as a test-bed to study vehicle dynamics and control, after false information is fed into the system. |
总页数: |
Warner, D. C.; Gerdes, R.; Biswas, B.; Heaslip, K. |
报告类型: |
科技报告 |