关键词: |
Counter-unmanned aerial systems, Unmanned aerial vehicles, Drones, Swarming technologies, Military doctrine, Case studies, Terrorists, Russia, Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices, Uas (unmanned aerial systems), C-uas (counter uas), Uav (unmanned aerial vehicles), Ua (unmanned aircraft), Counter-drones, Kinetic, Non-kinetic, Operational doctrine, Roe (rules of engagement), Non-state actors, Isis (isis islamic state in iraq and greater syria), State actors, Russo-ukraine war, Vbied (vehicle borne improvised explosive devices) |
摘要: |
This monograph asks if current US Army Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) doctrine enables operational commanders to deliver fires and preserve freedom of maneuver and action. This monograph argues that the US Army needs to create new operational doctrine addressing both detection and defense. Additionally, the employment and organization of these assets within US Army units need authoritative guidance. Recent state and non-state conflicts have demonstrated the need for focused doctrine incorporating new technology and emerging considerations for Rules of Engagement. Using the examples of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria attacks in Iraq, and the Russo-Ukraine War Zelenopillya rocket attack in the War in Donbas, this monograph highlights shortcomings in current US Army C-UAS doctrine. In order to address these shortcomings, the monograph recommends that the US Army update its C-UAS Army Training Manual, and create a C-UAS Army Doctrinal Publication, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication, and Field Manual. This new doctrine should frame C-UAS methods around the fundamental principles of detection and defensive systems, and include a discussion of how ROE may constrain operations. By developing this doctrine, the Army will provide clear guidance to commanders, enabling them to more effectively execute C-UAS missions. |