摘要: |
Prevention of the introduction of fissile materials into international shipping, and hence into a given country, is a complex problem. Some pieces of the solution to the puzzle are conceptually well defined, but lack definition of a technical pathway and/or operational implementation. Other elements are a little more fuzzy, and some elements are probably undefined at this point in time. This paper reviews the status of the more well-defined elements, and suggests needed additional measures to enhance the probability that fissile materials are not illicitly introduced into distant countries. International commerce proceeds through a number of steps from point of origin to final destination. Each step offers the possibility of a well-defined choke point to monitor and interdict the illicit shipment of fissile materials. However, because there are so many potential points and venues of entry into a large country such as the United States (e.g., air cargo, shipping containers, truck and rail transport, private vehicles, boats and planes, commercial passenger travel), it behooves the world to ensure that fissile material does not illicitly leave its point of origin. |