原文传递 Kvalitetskontrakter: Alternativer til Anbud for Kollektivtrafikken i Oslo (Quality Contracts: Alternative to Competitive Tendering for Public Transport in Oslo)
题名: Kvalitetskontrakter: Alternativer til Anbud for Kollektivtrafikken i Oslo (Quality Contracts: Alternative to Competitive Tendering for Public Transport in Oslo)
作者: Norheim, B.; Johansen, K. W.
关键词: Mass transportation##Subsidies##Government policies##Norway##Socieconomics##Contracts##Grants##Social welfare##Foreign technology##Oslo(Norway)##
摘要: The report discusses the consequences of the introduction of quality-dependent subsidy contracts in Oslo, i.e. a practical and manageable model which will provide most effective utilization of the subsidies to AS Oslo Sporveier seen from the standpoint of a service to the public. Our calculations show that the introduction of quality-dependent subsidies will provide a social economic benefit of about NOK 300 million p.a. without the need for increased subsidies. The efficiency potential will depend upon the framework for such a contract. The details of this subsidy contract and possible transitional adjustments must be the subject for negotiation, thereby influencing the 'optimal' level for the individual subsidy elements. The report recommends that a quality-dependent subsidy arrangement is introduced in Oslo on a trial basis for a five-year period and that this contains a 'safety net' in the form of minimum demands which must be met in order that the contract is not rescinded.
总页数: 104
报告类型: 科技报告
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