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原文传递 Group Purchasing Organizations: Federal Oversight and Self-Regulation

题名：	Group Purchasing Organizations: Federal Oversight and Self-Regulation
作者：	empty
关键词：	Group purchasing##Health care expenditures##Medicare##Medicaid##Federal spending##Health care providers##Purchasing intermediaries##Group purchasing organizations(GPO)##Hospitals##Vendors##
摘要：	Increases in health care expenditures in recent years have intensified congressional scrutiny of the costs of medical care. Federal spending for health care services provided though Medicare and Medicaid in fiscal year 2010 totaled 793.2 billionan increase from 514.3 billion in 2005. Federal spending for health care services is expected to continue to rise. The increase in federal spending for health care services can be attributed, in part, to the growth in health care costs, and an important component of those costs is the cost of products that hospitals and other health care providers purchase to provide care. Hospitals and other health care providers, including those that participate in Medicare and Medicaid, have faced pressures to address rising health care costs. These providers have increasingly relied on purchasing intermediaries known as group purchasing organizations (GPO). The GPOs, on behalf of their customers hospitals and other providers negotiate contracts for products and services with vendors such as manufacturers, distributors, and other suppliers. The types of goods and services hospitals and other providers purchase through these GPO-negotiated contracts range from commodities, such as cotton balls and bandages to high-technology medical devices, such as pacemakers and stents. Vendors pay fees to GPOs, known as contract administrative fees, which are typically based on a percentage of the costs of the products that GPO customers purchase through GPO-negotiated contracts. These fees are GPOs main source of operating revenue, which they are allowed to collect if they meet the requirements of a safe harbor to the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Actknown as the Anti-Kickback statutewhich would otherwise prohibit such fees. Previously, some questions were raised about whether or to what extent the fees GPOs receive from vendors create a financial incentive for GPOs that is inconsistent with obtaining the lowest possible prices on behalf of their customers and by extension, federal payers of health care.
总页数：	18
报告类型：	科技报告