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原文传递 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dynamic Traffic Equilibria

题名：	Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dynamic Traffic Equilibria
作者：	Boyles, S. D.; Melson, C.; Rambha, T.; Duthie, J. C.
关键词：	Traffic control##Transportation planning##Game theory##Computerized simulation##Dynamics##Equilibrium##Origin and destination studies##Policy decisions##Traffic flow##Transportation networks##Travel demand##Travel time##Dynamic traffic assignment(DTA)##
摘要：	The Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) problem extends the static traffic assignment (STA) problem by considering time-varying travel demand. Given the departure times of travelers in a network, an equilibrium is sought that ensures that travelers between an origin-destination (OD) pair departing at the same time experience equal and minimal travel time. DTA models are advantageous over their STA counterparts as they can capture the effects of dynamic queues and spillback, thus making them more realistic. Dynamic traffic assignment has grown steadily in popularity and use since its inception. It has become an important and permanent tool in transportation agencies across the country. However, the exact nature of dynamic traffic assignment equilibrium, including existence and uniqueness properties, is still not fully known, especially for simulation-based models. Multiple equilibria are possible, and equilibrium may not exist at all. This presents a problem to practitioners. Traffic flows from the model may be unrealistic and unrepresentative of actual conditions. If planners are using these inaccurate results, their policy decisions can dramatically and permanently worsen the transportation network.
总页数：	52
报告类型：	科技报告